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INTRODUCTION
International migration has become 
commonplace in the contemporary era of 
globalization. However, violations of workers’ 
rights and exploitation by agents, employers, or 
government agencies are coincident with such 
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ABSTRACT
Institutional placement mechanisms are inevitable in migrant services industries. However, some business com-
ponents in the recruitment process are unbalanced, whereby the migrant workers are entirely responsible for their 
departure costs and fees. Individual and institutional actors—banks, insurance companies, brokers, and private 
or even state recruitment institutions—are involved in the migrant workers sales market, and these conditions are 
faced by Indonesian migrant workers in general. As a result, debt bondage and slavery are typically character-
istic of Indonesian migrant workers. Using existing literature and a qualitative approach through case studies of 
Indonesian migrant workers in Taiwan, this article demonstrates the role of brokers (agencies) in managing and 
controlling migrant labor abroad. Even some of the placement and financial policies designed to help migrants with 
their debt bondage and agency exploitation are also prone to manipulation. Therefore, this article also explores 
what circumstances and conditions might lead Indonesian migrant workers in Taiwan to debt bondage and suggests 
improvements for migrant empowerment. 
Keywords: debt, slavery, migration industry, brokers (agency)
ABSTRAK
Kebijakan pengiriman tenaga kerja dan keputusan untuk bekerja keluar negeri terbukti telah memunculkan lembaga 
(aktor) parasit yang menangguk keuntungan dari proses penempatan tenaga kerja selain menimbulkan beban hutang 
bagi si pekerja. Walaupun kebijakan pengiriman tenaga kerja lumrah di lakukan negara dalam kondisi ketidakstabilan 
secara ekonomi, namun terdapat ketidakseimbangan posisi di antara para pelakunya. Hasil penelitian memperli-
hatkan industri pengiriman tenaga kerja (khususnya ke Taiwan) dikuasai oleh struktur aktor perantara (PJTKI dan 
agensi Taiwan), yang didukung oleh aturan masing-masing negara, berhak memonopoli biaya penempatan kerja 
dan potongan gaji yang harus dibayar oleh pekerja. Sistem ini sedikit banyak menguntungkan pihak perantara/
agensi dan menyebabkan kerugian bagi pekerja, dalam bentuk hutang kepada agensi atau kepada pihak lain. Hutang 
menjadi kata kunci untuk ‘menundukan’ pekerja turut pada aturan yang diberlakukan sepihak dan menjerat mereka 
pada kondisi perbudakan. Implikasi lebih besar sistem penempatan pekerja ini, antara lain: perdagangan manusia 
dan pekerja kaburan, berkurangnya pengiriman uang (remitan), serta ketiadaan akses bantuan hukum bagi pekerja 
yang di hinggapi persoalan. Pekerja yang mengandalkan diri pada mekanisme hutang tiada ampun dijadikan subyek 
pemotongan gaji dan pungutan lainnya atas nama asuransi. Tulisan ini berdasarkan hasil penelitian kualitatif dan 
penelusuran pustaka, pada kurun waktu 2014, terhadap pekerja migran Indonesia di Taiwan. 
Kata Kunci: hutang, perbudakan, industri pengiriman tenaga kerja, perantara (agensi)
migration, which is unacceptable. For instance, in 
the case of Indonesian migrant workers (Tenaga 
Kerja Indonesia, TKI), placement programs have 
reported instances of workers’ being subjected 
to verbal and physical abuse, debt bondage, and 
excessive exploitation through the recruitment 
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process, not only in the receiving countries but also 
after their return home (see Trafficking in Persons 
Report Taiwan 2013; Heyzer 2002; Human Rights 
Watch 2013; Fuch 2011; Sihombing 2008). In such 
cases, the state government and migrant agencies 
accused have neglected (not by coincidence) to 
protect migrant workers’ rights in terms of both 
personal protection for workers and placement fee 
management (Silvey 2004: 259; Irianto & Truong 
2014: 43). As a result, migrant workers often 
become victims in this unfair migration process 
that includes the recruiter/traffickers, the users 
(employers), and the policy makers who stand to 
gain in these situations (Fuch 2011: 2; Sihombing 
2008: 43). Although some recent improvements 
have been made in preventive measures and 
the working conditions of Indonesian migrant 
workers in Taiwan (see Pawestri 2013; Anwar 
2013; Widyowati 2014; Liang 2006), problems in 
their pre-departure situations and daily conditions 
remain unrecognized. Many migration-linked 
problems lack clarity, such as placement fees, 
debt bondage, and working conditions related 
to protection policies, which include migration 
financial credit, migrant empowerment, and 
law enforcement. Therefore, this paper seeks to 
question the conditions of Indonesian migrant 
workers in the context of the migration industry 
process and to examine the role of brokers 
(agencies) as main institutions—in fact, as an 
arm of the state—which, instead of regulating, 
have violated/manipulated migrant workers’ 
employment rights. I attempt to reveal the 
alignments between brokers (including the state) 
and employers that represent their attempts to 
make a market economy flourish (i.e., brokers 
combined with the labor market), even as they 
extricate exorbitant job placement fees and 
provide substandard living conditions for migrant 
workers. In addition, this article offers critical 
notes and suggestions concerning protection 
policies that allegedly reduce placement fees, 
especially in terms of micro-credit schemes that 
still cost the workers. 
I interviewed migrant workers and some 
institutions on the problems related to issues 
with the migration process, discrimination, or 
working conditions, and used these narratives to 
understand the human rights violations migrant 
workers are faced with, along with their social 
implications. I focus on the role of brokers 
for Indonesian migrant workers in Taiwan, 
especially with regard to misleading job placement 
promises, debt bondage, and unsatisfactory living 
conditions. I discuss the narratives of (mostly) 
victimized women workers to avoid gender 
bias because there are more Indonesian women 
migrant workers proportionately than men. I have 
also analyzed the moral economy of migration 
using debt philosophy. The data is based on my 
literature review as well as fieldwork in Taoyuan 
and Hsincu Counties and Taipei City from June 
to December 2014. I observed and conducted 
interviews with migrant worker victims and 
staff in one migrant detention center and migrant 
shelter, labor agencies, researchers at academic 
institutions, and government officials. Related 
literature was identified through an Internet search 
with the following keywords: “illegal migrant,” 
“indebtedness,” “slavery,” and “business migrant 
Indonesia-Taiwan.” This study is organized into 
four sections. Section 1 focuses on the Indonesian 
and Taiwanese migration industry, and section 
2 examines migrant regulations in Taiwan as 
well as the role of brokers. Section 3 discusses 
the link between the migration process and debt 
bondage/slavery process and its implications. The 
final section discusses an alternative perspective, 
focusing on migrant protection rather than 
financial problems for those who work abroad.
THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY
Migration as a part of the business industry 
has been the subject of numerous interdisciplinary 
studies. For instance, Kyle and Liang (2012) 
recognized the existence of migrant exporting 
schemes in which “a diverse range of people 
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may profit from migration by providing either 
legal or illegal services (p. 2-3).” Meanwhile, 
Harney (1977) introduced the term “commerce of 
migration” in reference to the activities of a set of 
intermediaries who profit by offering services to 
immigrants in their travels between the state of 
origin and foreign destinations (p. 47). Based on 
these activities, Salt and Stein (1997) proposed 
that migration as a business concept is a system 
of institutionalized networks with complex profit 
and loss accounts, including a set of institutions, 
agents, and individuals, each of which stands to 
make a commercial gain (p. 468); this definition 
considers a relatively broad range of social actors 
operating in sending regions. Moreover, Salt and 
Stein (1997) attempt to identify these actors in 
the migration industry practices as active profit 
seekers in the international migration business and 
the migrants as playing an overly passive role in 
setting their own migratory agendas—or in other 
words, in the process of producing migration (p. 
468).
The above three perspectives all noted that 
the actors in the commercialization process of 
international migration include labor recruiters 
and contractors, money lenders, travel agents, 
transportation providers, people providing 
legitimate and forged documents, smugglers, 
formal and informal remittance and courier 
service owners, as well as lawyers and notaries 
involved in legal and paralegal counseling. All 
of these actors offer services for profit, and they 
are routinely regarded as those who disrupt the 
orderly migration process (Hernández-León 2005: 
32). In sum, the migration industry consists of 
underprivileged entrepreneurs and enterprises 
acting as antagonists, rather than the protagonists 
they are supposed to be in the migration process 
(Adler 2000: 165; Rodríguez 1996: 21).
Ananta (2009) developed and examined 
Indonesian migrant workers and the migration 
industry surrounding their employment (p. 2-3). 
He characterized overseas labor business as 
“selling cheap overseas workers” to cater the 
market in richer economies that are experiencing 
a shortage of low-skilled workers. He argued 
that migrants become marketable goods that can 
be sold and purchased as well as merchandise. 
For instance, the business receives payment 
from the buyers of overseas workers. In this 
context, buyers are employers demanding cheap 
labor for industries, labor markets, or domestic 
requirements. The largest buyers of Indonesian 
cheap labors are from developed countries such as 
Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan. Businesses in migrants’ home 
countries provide services that place workers 
abroad with “handsome benefits”—that is, they 
manipulate the salaries the migrants will be paid, 
whereas the workers have an obligation to pay a 
deduction fee for 9-15 months to the agency. Such 
services, provided by local firms on a national and 
international level, involve numerous investors, 
actors, and various vested interests. Interestingly, 
the prospective workers are actually migration 
business customers, who are common people 
from villages, undereducated, poor, and lacking in 
information about working abroad. These workers 
are required to pay money by the migrant provider 
for a service that manufactures them so that they 
can be sold in the international market. It is a 
very interesting and extensive business practice, 
especially in rural Indonesia, wherein the workers 
must incur the cost of making themselves saleable. 
Actually, many institutions are involved in 
the Indonesian migration industry (world worker 
sales market): banks, insurance companies, 
brokers, and recruitment institutions (e.g., 
Perusahaan Jasa Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, the 
PJTKI, or in local language commonly known 
as PT, PJTKI, Agen, Sponsor). As a business, 
the Indonesian overseas labor market is a very 
promising and captive market, wherein powerless 
customers (as prospective overseas workers) can 
afford to pay for the services offered by the banks. 
Insurance companies reap benefits from this 
captive, oligopolistic Indonesian overseas labor 
market by selling financial protection in the case 
of illness and/or accidents (Ananta 2009: 5). In 
short, international labor migration in Indonesia 
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occurs through various regulated and unregulated 
agencies as well as legal institutions. In addition, 
many invisible actors, such as the agency referred 
to as Teikong’s and Calo’s, a term used by Ernst 
Spaan (1994), serve as recruitment agents that 
take advantage of potential workers and neglect 
any placement rules and regulations in place (p. 
93). According to the liaison officer of Migrant 
Care, Mrs. Anis Hidayah and Mr. Wahyu Susilo, 
although these agencies play a significant role 
in recruiting potential Indonesian workers, 
transporting and placing them overseas, as well 
as arranging their return, not all agencies provide 
perfect services to these workers. In addition, the 
Indonesian government is also responsible for 
ensuring that these labor recruiters do not breach 
migrant workers’ rights
In Taiwan, the government decided to rely 
on the broker system to implement its guest 
worker program. Taiwan’s government did 
more than relegate responsibility to the market; 
it moved beyond its traditional developmental 
duties of insulating industries and fostered 
competition through a neoliberal style (Surak 
2014: 1). According to Surak, the resultant system 
meant not only that potential participants from 
the migrant exporting states were competing 
for limited spots but also that they were paying 
higher broker fees than those incurred by other 
countries for their guest worker schemes (Surak 
2014: 10). This fact underscored the reality that 
employers hired people deemed to be “useless” 
(e.g., women for construction jobs) to maintain 
their migrant quotas, while the employment 
agencies—that is, the brokers—engaged in rabid 
competition. Furthermore, the 800 licensed firms 
in this close-knit sector, which is dominated by 
a handful of large businesses, paid employers as 
much as USD$700 per migrant worker to handle 
their cases (CLA 2003). This fee was eventually 
redeemed from the migrants, which was typically 
will be deducted more than their wages for 
nine months (CLA 2003; Lan 2003). With the 
presence of activist governments and watchdog 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) holding 
down brokers’ fees, migrant workers from the 
Philippines and Thailand were able to gain some 
money at year’s end, but those from Vietnam and 
Indonesia were often less fortunate (Surak 2014; 
Lan 2003). 
In sum, the migration industry encompasses 
a whole process in sending workers and involving 
many commercial actors/institutions. Thus, 
the migration industry needs to be perceived 
through a broader prism than it usually is, 
especially for understanding the impact of the 
commercialization of international migration 
and what may happen to migrants after they are 
placed in a job, particularly with regard to the 
conditions of petty harassment that often emerge. 
The consequence of the migration industry, in 
fact, is the emergence of negative aspects such as 
debt bondage and slavery in the countries faced 
with migration, and there are extensive economic 
implications as well. 
THE MIGRATION BROKERAGE 
SYSTEM
In general, the migration brokerage system 
includes the intermediate mechanisms bridging 
people in one state to those in another state. 
Brokerage is used because not all persons are 
connected via direct links to the relevant others 
(Faist 2014: 6). It occurs at the interstices 
of formal and informal practices, such as 
acquiring a visa or connecting with traffickers 
or middlepersons; finding employment, housing, 
child or elderly care; accessing social services; 
entering organizations in the place of destination; 
and accessing channels for return or onward 
migration (Faist 2014: 7). Brokers (middlepersons) 
are often also involved in either official (i.e., 
institutional) or unofficial recruitment (Spaan 
1994: 210). The migration brokerage system 
in Indonesia, which has been operating since 
1983, was first introduced under the New Order 
Regime—namely, AKAN (Angkatan Kerja Antar 
Negeri or Labor Movement between Countries). 
Its name was changed periodically until, in 2004, 
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it became BNP2TKI (Badan National Penempatan 
dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia or 
National Authority For Manpower Placement & 
Protection Abroad; see for detail history in Spaan 
1999: 159; Silvery 2004: 251; Pawestri 2011: 30).
Two conditions get migrant workers into 
the brokerage system through deception. First, 
“the tricky law,” based on Law No. 39 (2004) 
on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian 
Workers Abroad, mandates that every Indonesian 
migrant worker who works outside the country 
must pass through the Labor Service Company 
of Indonesia (Perusahaan Jasa Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia/PJTKI). This policy is called the “one 
exit door policy,” which means that migrants can 
work abroad only through this regulation; if not, 
the worker is regarded as an “illegal worker” 
(Mafruhah et. al 2012: 249-250). The law likewise 
defines a placement service as one that is “cheap, 
quick, uncomplicated, and safe,” as opposed to 
other means; this may be translated as “if you 
want quick, then you have to pay.” The second 
is called the “poverty condition.” The majority 
of Indonesian migrant workers going to Taiwan 
must secure loans to pay their placement fees, 
usually based on the cost management regulations 
pre-determined by the agency (brokers). In other 
words, to work in Taiwan, one must have the 
funds to buy the job. Indeed, most Indonesian 
migrant workers live in poverty because they 
cannot afford recurring payments. However, it 
can be assumed that even in cases where migrants 
could manage the funds, the brokers will not allow 
them to contact the employers directly because 
of this profitable arrangement. As a result, upon 
arriving in Taiwan, these workers are immediately 
indebted to the brokers and forced to pay off the 
loans through salary deductions. The system ties 
workers into a hegemonic brokerage pattern. 
Figure 1 shows the pattern of brokerage 
practices governing Indonesian workers in Taiwan 
in the job placement system. This chart shows 
the role of the commercial agents, which is to 
recruit the workers, provide training, find them 
employment (agents in Indonesia would contact 
agents in Taiwan), arrange their passage, provide 
loans, draw up contracts, remit their remuneration, 
arrange their repatriation, etc. The steps of 
Indonesian brokerage in the migration industry to 
Taiwan are as follows: first, the workers usually 
obtain work info abroad from migrant agency field 
brokers or unofficial persons. According to staff 
at the Indonesian Worker Association in Taiwan 
(IPIT), there is an unstated contract that indicates 
an “illegal” cost that migrants are obligated to 
pay: that is, they have to pay USD$500 for job 
information retained from migrant worker to 
broker (petugas lapangan). Second, the workers 
go or are sent to a shelter for a short job training 
session, after which they depart to Taiwan. 
Employers in Taiwan typically rely on the 
services of labor brokers in Taiwan and placement 
agencies in migrant home countries to fill their 
labor requirements. In Taiwan, middlemen 
in recruitment, hiring, and employment are 
referred to as “labor brokers,” or sometimes as 
Figure 1 Indonesia-Taiwan Brokerage Role and Job Placement System
Source: Rudolf, Fieldwork 2014
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“foreign worker coordinators.” The Taiwan Labor 
Standards Law divided recruitment of migrant 
workers into three categories: brokerage system 
(the agencies are given the right to make salary 
deductions), income tax and forced saving, and 
regulation and management of migrant workers 
(CLA 2013). In terms of the brokerage system, 
placement fees and wage deductions, as of 
September 1, 2004, the Council of Labor Affairs 
(CLA) imposed a new regulation requiring 
migrant workers (new hires), employers, and 
brokers to sign affidavits specifying the loan 
amount that migrants “borrowed” from their 
placement agencies prior to deployment (CLA 
2013). This “Salaries, Fees and Declaration Form” 
also specifies the migrant worker’s monthly 
salary, monthly broker’s service fee, health and 
labor insurance fees, income tax, resident permit 
fee, medical check-up fees, and return airfare 
(O’Neill 2008). These placement fee regulations 
were applicable not only for Indonesian migrant 
workers but also for those in various positions 
from the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam 
(Lan 2003). It takes an Indonesian migrant 
worker with regular wages an average of around 
9–15 months to pay off the debts. In addition to 
repaying the placement fee, loan, or any money 
borrowed, they must also pay a broker’s fee 
(usually a three-year contract), legally collected 
through monthly installments (O’Neill 2008). 
Taiwan-bound migrant workers also have to pay 
for their own travel apart from the aforementioned 
salary deductions. In earlier times, their air travel 
was reimbursed by the employer. The following 
instance of an Indonesian female working as 
a domestic worker in Taipei demonstrates the 
required payment of a placement fee and salary 
deductions. It also describes the typical amount for 
salary deductions and placement and brokerage 
fees in Taiwan (see Table 1).
 Ayu (a pseudonym), a female factory 
worker from Bandar Lampung, Lampung 
Province, has come to Taiwan twice. 
Each time, she had to pay Rp. 20,000,000 
(USD$2000) to Indonesian agencies 
for agency fees, training fees, tickets, 
visa fees, and an administrative letter 
from the Taiwan Economic and Trade 
Office and BNP2TKI. The fees also 
included transportation and job fees for 
the broker officer (petugas lapangan). 
She also had to pay a salary deduction 
and others deductions/obligations while 
working in the factory for such items 
as food, dormitory, agency fee, bank 
deduction, health insurance, savings, 
and taxes for as long as 10 months. 
She cannot complain about all these 
deductions because, first, this is the rule, 
as her broker said. Second, there is no 
direct hiring mechanism for workers 
in factory jobs, so she has to follow 
the same situation as well as the first 
came to work abroad. She said, “We 
[Indonesian workers] can’t do anything; 
we just accept what we get (nrimo) and 
keep saving our money to send home” 
(interviewed October 10, 2014).
Clearly, overseas workers are the most 
important “customers” in the business of sending 
workers abroad. It is ironic that the value of a 
better income and life for migrants is reduced by 
the economic value of being taken advantage of 
through measures for “helping” the workers. Based 
on my observation of the experience Indonesian 
workers in Taiwan, these practices are common, 
and every stakeholder involved knows the rules 
of the game, the so-called “looking money from 
migrants, cari duit dari TKI.” Such services are 
sold to the captive market of Indonesian overseas 
workers in all of their migration stages. It is a 
market wherein the workers do not have many 
options except to follow and pay for the services 
provided by the industry. Moreover, rather than 
teaching the workers ways to gain employment by 
themselves, the industry has created a dependency 
on various actors for working overseas. 
A CONSEQUENCE OF MIGRATION 
INDUSTRY
 Lisa (28) had prepared the documents: 
her passport and the application form 
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Table 1.  Placement Fees for Indonesian Workers in Taiwan
No Placement cost
Formal Work Informal Work
Factory Ship Crew Old Folk Home Domestic Workers
1
Placement fee in 
Taiwan
(China Trust)
NT$ 8250 x 10 
months























4 Accommodation fee NT$ 4500- NT$ 2500 –      NA
5 Broker’s fee (legally by Taiwan Gov)
Firs year NT$ 1800 x 12 = NT$ 21,600
Second year  NT$ 1,700
Third year NT$ 1,500
6 Tax (from Taiwan Gov)
- Before 1 July (6%: NT$ 1,040
- After 1 July 20% (NT$ 3450x 6 month), after 6 months NT$ 1,040 per 
month.
7 Medical body check (from Taiwan Gov) NT$ 2000 per year
8 Identity card (ARC)  (from Taiwan Gov) NT$ 1000 per year
9 Saving(Not must but must) NT$ 2,000 NT$ 2,000 NT$ 2,000 NT$ 2,000
10
Placement fee in 
Indonesia pay to 
PJTKI (averages*)
NT$ 50,000 NT$ 20,000 NT$ 40,000 NT$ 30,000
Source: Migrant Struggle (2012)
to return home for good after working 
illegally in Taiwan for 1.5 years. I 
accompanied her to Hsincu Immigration 
Office to report and go through an 
administrative procedure. She was a 
bit nervous and worried that the police 
would arrest and send her to jail or 
detention center. However, she was 
simply asked several questions and 
informed of the standard deportation 
procedure for an illegal migrant as 
they were checking her documents. 
Meanwhile, I observed a group of 
illegal migrants who also reported and 
submitted the documents needed in order 
to return to their home country. While 
waiting for the deportation document to 
be processed, Lisa told her story about 
why she became an illegal migrant 
worker. She began by saying that being 
an illegal migrant worker (TKI Kaburan) 
is like having an “abnormal” life. She 
could not make friends normally, not 
even a boyfriend, or get a normal salary 
or health insurance. On the other hand, 
a legal worker’s life seems to be just 
“normal.” As addition information, 
according to data from The Ministry of 
Taiwan, at the end of July 2014, there 
were 45,579 illegal/ undocumented 
migrant workers in Taiwan, with detailed 
numbers as follows: 21,521 Indonesians; 
20,615 Vietnamese; 2,460 Philippines; 
and 983 from Thailand.
 Lisa came to Taiwan for the first time in 
2010 as a legal worker. She took care of 
an elderly paralyzed lady. She worked 
for just two years and returned home 
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when the person whom she had cared 
for died. Coming home at Bintan City, 
Sumatera Island, she found her mother 
was sick and she needed some money for 
medical treatment. The salary she had 
made and saved during her two years 
of working in Taiwan was not enough to 
pay the expenses of the treatment as well 
her family’s daily needs.  In early 2012 
she decided to go back to Taiwan with a 
lot of debt: USD$1,300 for her mother’s 
treatment that she had borrowed from 
her uncle and USD$1,000 from the 
agency for paying her trip tickets and 
administrative fees. She had worked 
just two weeks when the immigration 
police came to check her employer 
and found false documents and other 
fake information about her work: there 
was no paralyzed person at home, for 
example.  She was forced to finish her job 
and return home again. The agency that 
had arranged her work in Taiwan also 
suggested that she return home, and she 
had to pay back the loan because they 
failed to find another employer for her. 
 Considering her debts both to her relative 
in Indonesia and the agency, she decided 
to work without legal documents. She 
moved from Taipei to Kaoshiung to visit 
a friend who was also an illegal worker 
(TKI Kaburan) and was introduced to 
an illegal agency. As usual, an illegal 
worker is introduced to the illegal 
worker/agency by another illegal one. 
 Business relating to illegal/undocumented 
workers seems risky, but it is profitable. 
For instance, from each employment, 
the agency gets “service money” (uang 
jasa) of 3,000-5,000 NTD (USD$120-
200) per month from the total salary. 
During her six months of working 
illegally, Lisa changed her work several 
times, from nursing old people at the 
hospital, to picking up kids at school and 
waitressing in a restaurant. Her salary 
ranged between 25,000 and 30,000 
NTD (USD$1,000-1,200). However, she 
had to pay the illegal agency “service 
money” and cost of living, and she saved 
the rest of the money. Finally, after six 
months of working illegally, she could 
pay her debts. Then, she was offered 
a job at a fruit plantation around the 
Nantou Mountain area, but this time 
her agency asked for 8,000 NTD per 
month (USD$320) out of 25,000 NTD 
(USD$1,000). The deduction fee was 
abnormally high, but as usual, illegal 
workers cannot complain. Luckily, her 
boss (laopan) was very kind, and he 
understood the situation. Lisa and her 
boss staged a drama to deceive the 
“bad” agency. She told the agency that 
she had been badly treated by her boss, 
and the boss also complained to the 
agency that they had sent a lazy worker. 
Then, her boss called the agency saying 
that the worker had escaped and that he 
could not pay the salary anymore. When 
the agency came to check, they could 
not find her because she was hiding 
in an underground “bunker” on the 
plantation.  Consequently, the agreement 
between her boss and the agency was 
cancelled, and after that, Lisa got a full 
salary and could save more money. Her 
boss facilitated anything she needed 
accept health insurance because she 
worked illegally. One year later, Lisa 
decided to go home for good because she 
wanted to take care of her mother, who 
was sick and old (interviewed October 
18, 2014).
Three situations in this employment process 
evoke reflection, based on the aforementioned 
explanation: 1) unemployed migrant workers, 
because of their poverty, accept a job offer from 
an agent or friends; 2) they must pay money to 
an agent/company in order to work; and 3) they 
struggle to earn a salary to support their families 
at home while paying off their own debts. This 
cycle indicates that some workers fail to predict 
the grim working conditions and, consequently, 
face abusive working conditions and uncertain 
business practices. My observations of Indonesian 
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domestic workers have shown that it takes them 
months or even years to be debt-free, although they 
work a grueling schedule. Such situations tend to 
occur when workers are either tricked or trapped 
into working for low/no pay or if the details of the 
contract are ambiguous. The Asia Pacific Forum 
on Women, Law and Development (APFWLD) 
has observed that the value of domestic work is 
unfairly assessed. These experiences indicate 
that the work contract can become an instrument 
of debt bondage by legal definition and may be 
used as a tool for work limitations (APFWLD 
2011: 27).
In regard to migrant debt as a consequence 
of the migration industry, the migrant workers’ 
position is that of debtors who must pay a lender 
for buying jobs in which they provide the energy 
for the work. According to David Graeber (2011), 
a debt in the migration industry is an exchange 
that has not been brought to completion (p. 73-
87). One party receives the goods/advantages; the 
other is owed a payment. To fail to honor a debt, 
therefore, is to be in a condition of guilt on either 
moral and economic grounds, or in other words, 
“they’d borrowed the money. Surely one has to 
pay one’s debts.” As David Graeber observed, 
although a wage-labor contract is, ostensibly, 
a free contract between equals, it is also “an 
agreement between equals in which both agree 
that once one of them punches the time clock, 
they won’t be equals anymore.” Moreover, debt 
essentially is an “agreement between equals to no 
longer be equal” (Graeber 2011: 73-87). Graeber 
mentions this situation as an economic paradigm, 
ignoring the moral paradigm, which is a moral 
obligation in the context of the migration industry 
to understand the social reciprocity of the actors 
involved and migrant workers as a part of human 
relationships. Thus, this kind of relationship is 
supposed to express certain equality between 
creditor and debtor, with no exploitation of the 
debtors. 
We may extend Graeber’s perspective by 
observing that because humans are social beings, 
they need each other. Thus, in social relationships 
there should no controlling or being controlled. 
However, contrary to this perspective, in the 
migration industry, there is, in fact, no mercy for 
migrant workers who work abroad so that they 
can improve their living conditions. Instead, 
employers and brokers exploit salaries based on 
legal contracts that clearly state that the debtor 
must repay the debt. This situation is worsening 
because many workers are undereducated and 
unaware of their rights. Employers and brokers 
take advantage of this lack of knowledge by 
providing false information about laws and the 
attitudes of authorities or by simply threatening 
that workers who complain will be sent home. 
In this context, if workers attempt to report 
an abusive situation to the police, the act is 
synonymous with returning home. This type of 
vulnerability and dependence created through 
the brokerage system can be seen as a possible 
origin of slavery.
One can argue that migrant workers’ debt 
bondage can be a form of slavery in advanced or, 
in other words, forced labor, as both situations 
(debt bondage and forced labor) enslave a 
person with regard to the broker/employer. It 
is common in Taiwan for migrant domestic 
workers to work every day of the week without 
a break and to be ready for work 24 hours a day, 
as they live in the employers’ household. As 
mentioned earlier, they have to work for low pay 
and unreasonable working hours because paper 
contracts are often not clear. Even male factory 
workers have similar experiences, as they have 
to do other work besides their main job, such 
as cleaning factory machines. The high demand 
for migrant workers in destination countries and 
the existence of recruitment agencies and people 
willing to facilitate jobs have provided the thrust 
for transforming these migrants into slaves. Like 
the Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and 
Development (APFWLD 2011: 76), I believe that 
inadequate employment opportunities, poor living 
conditions, lack of basic education, and poor 
health services are the factors that have caused the 
emergence of this business industry. Furthermore, 
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the contractual relationship can become a form of 
bondage or slavery in two ways: (1) if the value 
of the service is not applied toward paying off the 
debt or, in other words, if the worker is performing 
much more work than he or she should to pay 
off the loan and (2) if the duration and nature 
of the work are not respectively limited and 
defined. This is a result of an unclear contract, as 
mentioned above, by which migrants get trapped 
into bad working conditions (APFWLD 2011: 76). 
Based on the explanation above, another 
consequence of the Indonesian migration 
industry is the relatively new phenomenon of 
people entering (modern) human slavery (Fuch 
2011; Allain 2012). Traditionally, slavery refers 
to persons who are trafficked and enslaved in 
the country of their birth (Human Rights Watch 
2006: 1). They may be terrorized by their owners 
into fearing the authorities, even though they 
are technically entitled to state protection. This 
perspective is based on the traditional idea of natal 
alienation, wherein persons who find themselves 
illegally transported to foreign countries fear 
seeking the protection of law enforcement and 
other state authorities (Patterson 2012: 6). As a 
result, they are isolated from familial and social 
ties. However, modernization has radically 
institutionalized traditional slavery (Davidson 
2013: 2). In this current situation, laborers are 
increasingly alienated from traditional contractual 
relationships (employer to employee) and are 
instead recruited by middlemen contractors 
(state and brokers) and sub‐contractors, many of 
the workers being exploited laborers from poor 
villages and families. In the past, employers would 
buy slaves from other employers, but in modern-
day slavery, the migrant workers themselves 
must repay any recruitment-related debts to labor 
agents, sub-agents, banks, and moneylenders 
(Davidson 2013: 20). In addition, indebted and 
bonded factory workers, like their counterparts 
in the modernized farming sector, have little or 
nothing to do with the recruitment process, apart 
from the few regular employees that constitute 
the formal workforce (Allain 2012).
I would like to offer another case to illustrate 
migrants’ situation in working abroad. I will call 
her Sari (27 y/o); she is a migrant worker from 
Semarang, Central Java. I was surprised to learn 
that she had been an illegal worker in Taiwan 
since about seven years ago. The first time, 
she came to Taiwan to work as a caregiver in a 
private household. She borrowed Rp. 18,000,000 
(USD$1,800) from her agency. Her working 
contract specified her duty as taking care of the 
elderly parents in the household, but in fact she 
also had to do housework and other tasks assigned 
by her employer. Even at that young age she had 
experienced working abroad, but she had never 
before experienced the working conditions here: 
not being allowed to leave the house because 
the elderly parents were not to be left alone, no 
holiday, no mobile phone, and an unreasonable 
fee deduction (the first month she received 3,000 
NTD (USD$120) and the second month 3,500 
NTD (USD$140). She held out only three months 
before deciding to become an undocumented 
worker for seven years as a TKI kaburan, though 
she retained the same profession of housecleaning 
(Interview in August, 2014).
The abundant and growing body of slavery 
appears under the guise of domination of 
individuals by institutions in the present era of 
globalization. The role of broker or agency in this 
kind of migration industry is visibly expressed 
by abusive employers, which is occasionally 
described as “modern slavery” (Davidson 2013: 
1). Many migrant workers in Taiwan, who are 
under the control of labor contractors, are in 
temporary debt bondage that verges on servitude. 
In a number of migrant workers’ cases of debt 
bondage to labor contractors (or who have been 
sold by these contractors to employers), the 
persons have been reduced to actual slavery. 
For instance, Bridget Anderson, in her work on 
immigrant domestics in Britain, compellingly 
identifies the key element that transforms domestic 
labor into genuine slavery as the fact that what the 
employer wants is not the “the labor power” of the 
domestic worker but her “personhood” (Anderson 
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2012: 55). Similar to the case in Taiwan presented 
above, the employer is buying the power to 
command, not the property of the person but the 
whole person. Because migrant workers end up 
being employed by private persons, they work 
in the private sphere, which is not considered as 
a workplace, thus escalating the risk of forced 
labor and slavery. In many cases, because of 
salary deductions, they are even dependent on 
their employers for shelter and food. A few who 
are brave run away.
CERTAIN PRACTICAL 
IMPLICATIONS
Human Trafficking and Smuggling in 
Taiwan
Besides the illegal/undocumented worker 
conditions as mentioned above, Taiwan faces a 
problem with human trafficking and smuggling. 
There were 484,367 foreign workers in Taiwan in 
2013, with Indonesia being the largest contributor 
at 211,118 migrant workers, which was almost 
half of the total number of foreign workers in the 
country (CLA 2013). The Taiwan immigration 
office identified and assisted 462 trafficking 
victims in 2012, of which 152 were victims of 
labor trafficking and 310 of sex trafficking, most 
of whom were Indonesian and Vietnamese; all 
462 victims were referred to care facilities for 
assistance (American Institute 2013). In 2012, 
the Taiwan Human Trafficking in Persons Report 
stated that the largest number of human trafficking 
victims was Indonesian (American Institute, 
2013). According to the Chief of Immigration 
Division and Chief of Labor Division of Division 
at the Indonesian Economic and Trade Office 
(IETO), Indonesian human trafficking victims 
in Taiwan can be divided into three types: 1) 
runaways trapped by illicit agents in Taiwan; 2) 
victims of internal trafficking in Indonesia, which 
is very rare in Taiwan; and 3) laborers exploited 
by employers. According to them, most of the 
victims in Indonesian human trafficking are 
runaway workers facing challenges in adapting to 
their employers because of cultural and religious 
differences. The Chief of the Illegal Immigration 
Management Section (Immigration Affairs 
Division) from the National Immigration Agency 
(NIA) in Taipei also acknowledge this particular 
motive. Additional reasons for runaway workers 
include forced salary deductions to pay the debt 
of the initial expenses and to reimburse the agent 
in Taiwan, and illicit pressure from agents wishing 
to increase their revenues. The Deputy Director 
of the IETO Shelter in Taoyuan also mentioned 
that the modus operandi involving Indonesian 
human trafficking victims can be attributed 
mostly to “bad agents” and “bad employers” who 
encroach upon employees’ rights and want to take 
advantage of the victims’ weaknesses.
Remittances Impact on Indonesian 
Overseas Workers 
The workers often migrate for domestic 
work with the expectation of remittances to care 
for their families. However, such expectations 
sometimes do not come to fruition. Migrant 
workers in some cases even choose to stay and 
become illegal workers rather than returning 
home without repaying their debts. There are 
very many examples of Indonesians workers like 
Lisa’s case, as mentioned above, wherein both 
legal and illegal/undocumented migrants send 
half their salaries to their family in Indonesia. 
Because of salary deductions in Taiwan and 
debts in Indonesia, most of them cannot send 
remittance money until after they have worked 
a year. Those who need emergency money for 
children’s education, sick parents, a pregnant wife, 
or something else, do not have much choice, and 
some of them choose to become runaway workers 
and to risk being an illegal worker as a shortcut 
to gaining money for their families. As illegal/
undocumented workers, they risk being put in 
jail, deported, working under employer pressure, 
or becoming victims of human trafficking. Their 
unforeseen situations intensify their sufferings as 
they give up hope for a better life. 
However, this debt bondage is contrary to the 
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government’s idea of promoting foreign exchange 
(devisa negara) through migrant workers. The 
Indonesian government has focused on mobilizing 
annual remittances (money transfers) rather 
prioritizing migrant protection (see PSDR report, 
2009). Although the Indonesian government 
relies on migrant workers’ remittances, it has 
had no serious policy with regard to remittance 
management. Indonesian migrant remittances 
from Taiwan have been poor compared to those 
from Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines 
(Jakarta Post  2012). One of the reasons for 
these countries’ success was that they established 
policies to send migrant workers abroad with 
governance-oriented migration protection through 
low-cost migration schemes. The Philippines and 
Vietnam even applied a standard money exchange 
for remittance transfers (Jakarta Post  2012). 
However, in Taiwan, private companies, such 
as remittance institutions and Indonesian stores, 
take advantage of the money exchange to make 
a profit by informally using Internet banking, 
reaping advantages from the remittance cost and 
the differences in currency exchange rates. In such 
cases, Indonesian workers are subject to extortion 
via their remittance money. I recommend 
maximum protection from the government and 
NGOs in the form of regulating remittance 
systems to provide a sense of productivity and 
decent wages that will boost remittances for the 
migrant workers. At the time I completed my 
research, the regulation of remittance systems had 
not yet been realized. 
The government’s strategy to increase 
the volume of migrant workers’ remittances 
is still very traditional with the thought that a 
maximum number of migrants will ensure higher 
remittances. Politicians lack the will to design a 
policy for low-cost migration, although the costs 
of placement fees have increased annually. Such 
high costs have forced migrant workers into 
debt bondage, trafficking, and even unintended 
slavery. Given that the Indonesian government 
lacks a comprehensive policy for remittance 
management, perhaps it is not considered to be an 
immediate problem. Nonetheless, remittances are 
related to migration costs. Unchanged conditions 
in low-cost migration, to some extent, will affect 
the sending of remittances to migrants’ countries 
(villages) of origin, in turn, failing to stimulate 
regional economies. Remittances are one of 
the most visible and tangible contributions of 
migrants to their home countries. The money 
migrants send to their families pays for food, 
education, and healthcare, easing day-to-day 
hardship and poverty and contributing to the 
achievement of the local development goals 
(PSDR Report 2009). In high-cost schemes and 
debt-finance migration, the circulation of migrant 
remittances conforms to a hierarchy of debt 
repayment, consumption, and finally economic 
investment. Such schemes introduce a vicious 
cycle wherein the remittances of migrant workers 
are used only to pay debts, fall into more debt, and 
make successive payments to settle them (known 
as gali lubang tutup lubang/robbing Peter to pay 
Paul). Thus, without government’s involvement 
in remittance management, migrant workers will 
be further subject to debt bondage, trafficking, 
or slavery.
Lack of Legal Protection Services
An Indonesian worker with little education 
and a poor intention to migrate overseas may 
encounter various challenges during each phase 
of migration as experienced workers in Taiwan. 
The challenges faced at pre-departure include the 
possibility of high cost recruitments and document 
manipulation. Based on my observation and 
interviews with the Indonesian Migrant Worker 
Organization in Taiwan (Ikatan Pekerja Indonesia 
di Taiwan, IPIT) and Indonesian Workers 
Association in Taiwan (Asosiasi Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia Taiwan, ATKI), typical cases include 
the following: 1) recruitment by an illegal supplier 
of the Service of Indonesian Workers (PJTKI); 
recruitment arranged by a legal supplier of the 
PJTKI without a clear job order; recruitment and 
departure arranged by agents and not through 
the PJTKI; recruitment of children below the 
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age of 18, and recruitment of illiterate immigrant 
workers. Other challenges faced at and beyond 
recruitment include the following: 1) counterfeit 
documents, 2) being fettered to the creditors, 3) 
not being paid for work, 4) being prohibited from 
contact with their own families or relatives, 5) 
torture or other mistreatment; 6) inability to return 
home; 7) detention by security at the airport or 
harbor for various reasons; 8) unjust treatment at 
the airport or harbor; and 9) incidences of mental 
illness and depression.
In Taiwan, the Indonesian government is 
responsible for protecting migrant workers whose 
rights have been violated and for redressing them. 
On April 28, 2013, the headquarters of Kantor 
Dagang dan Ekonomi Indonesia di Taipei (KDEI 
Taipei) formed the Labor Protection Task Force 
of Indonesia with 20 members. The team’s goal 
is to protect the interests of TKI in realizing the 
fulfillment of their rights in accordance with the 
laws and regulations. It also attempts to improve 
the handling of TKI in a more intensive, effective, 
and efficient manner to resolve their issues. 
Meanwhile, the Indonesian government has begun 
to provide temporary shelter for migrant workers 
and is channeling resources to create crisis centers 
(shelters) for victims of violence in Taiwan. 
Between January and August 2014, there were 
16 TKI in Shelter Taoyuan, 8 in Shelter Taichung, 
and 6 in Shelter Zhongli (IETO, 2014). However, 
most of these shelters are small, representing 
isolated, ad hoc efforts to address the needs of 
migrant workers. 
Other self-help institutions exist to which 
migrants may turn in their difficulties, one example 
being the Toko Indonesia (Indonesian store). 
Indonesian stores can distinguish themselves as 
non-formal migration agencies, as the proprietors 
can help immigrants with their problems and 
thereby be assured of attracting Indonesian 
migrant clients. From their standing among 
Indonesians in Taiwan, they serve as brokers 
between troubled Indonesian migrant workers 
and the Taiwanese government (immigration 
office or police), as well as translators and 
agencies for solving administrative problem. The 
relationship between entrepreneurs and migrant 
workers, in a broad sense, shows the possibility 
of empowerment and capacity building in 
Indonesian migrant society in Taiwan. However, it 
is important to note that adequately addressing the 
needs of migrant workers who have been cheated, 
exploited, or abused requires a strong, well-
coordinated response by various organizations 
and strength of political will.
NOTES FOR IMPROVEMENT
In this case, there are three important 
situations that need improvement if migrant 
worker problems are to be addressed: education 
of workers, equal rights, and joint cooperation 
(Setyawati 2013: 275– 277; Farbenblum et al, 
2013: 24; Irianto & Truong 2014: 37). Educating 
and training prospective migrant labors is vital 
to the improvement of their knowledge of basic 
rights and reduced number of mistreatment cases 
by their prospective employers. However, based 
on Indonesian Law No 39/2004, the Indonesian 
government has assigned the right to educate 
workers to private agencies. In the context of 
migration as an industry, agencies have advanced 
in terms of business aspects rather than in 
educating migrants. The Indonesian government’s 
only function is to monitor whether the workers 
have received adequate training through the Final 
Pre-Departure Briefing program (or Pembekalan 
Akhir Pemberangkatan/PAP) (IOM, 2010), and in 
education, the government has not been effective. 
In terms of migrant rights, both governments 
are obliged to ensure workers’ basic human 
rights, including the right to return to their home 
countries, the right to be informed of working 
conditions before taking up employment, and the 
right to form trade unions. Unfortunately, migrant 
workers have often become isolated machines, 
deprived of the freedom and opportunity to claim 
and exercise their rights (Fuch 2011; Li 2011: 139-
151). In regard with institutional endeavors, joint 
cooperation among different local NGOs, and 
between Indonesia and other related international 
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organizations in Taiwan, is quite limited (Li 2011: 
139-151). Thus, at least in Taiwan, the three basic 
aspects in which migrant improvement is required 
should be studied further.
We should note one important program 
regarding placement fees for working abroad. In 
December 15, 2010, the Indonesian Government 
launched a business credit program (Kredit Usaha 
Rakyat, KUR), designed to give Indonesian 
workers the ability to access bank credit for 
paying their placement fees. Interest rates for 
financing credit are set at a maximum of 22 
percent per annum, for a maximum of three 
years and not to exceed three years’ worth of 
deductions from the migrants’ contracts (see 
for detail Kementrian Koordinator Bidang 
Ekonomi 2014: 9-13). However, this scheme 
lacks consideration of the migration process 
and the worker administration procedures, as 
already explained above. For instance, placement 
fees in Taiwan are theoretically the employers’ 
responsibility and are charged to the workers as 
one month’s salary. In fact, all administration 
fees, such as tickets, visas, and training fees are 
charge to migrants and they have to pay it over 
9-10 months through salary deductions. Other 
criticisms of this business credit program are the 
demanding banking regulations, such as a fixed 
payment time, the requirements for a letter of 
guarantee and complicated request letter, and 
interest rates that are still high compared to those 
of private banking and migrant company agencies; 
thus, this programs needs further evaluation. In 
this case, private agencies offer more flexibility 
administratively, and they are better coordinated 
with local migrant manpower agencies. Thus, 
migrant workers are still disadvantaged subjects 
of the migration industry schemes.
Another aspect for improving migrant 
protection and empowerment is migrant group’s 
solidarity. I refer to the idea of bonded solidarity 
(Portes 1995), which itself is the source of collec-
tive work, embodied in the form of cooperation 
among Indonesian migrants in Taiwan. In my 
study (Yuniarto 2014), collective work is deter-
mined by the financial limitations of the migrants, 
the long distances required to spread information, 
and networking among migrant organizations in 
Taiwan. The purpose of the collective work model 
is to strengthen individual, organizational or reli-
gious kinship. Collective work, rather than being 
simply for economic purposes or group networks, 
forms the basis for long-term group identity, as 
Vertovec (1999) and Lewellen (2002) have shown, 
and sets migrants off from other ethnic groups. 
As observed, Indonesian migrant communities in 
Taiwan tend toward collectives, indicating that 
they are more unified and ecumenical than they 
are in their homeland. They are certainly easily 
affected by acts of love and kindness from their 
friends in the host society, such as the forming 
of migrant group associations. This exemplary 
collective work helps migrant workers to bring 
their homeland values and apply them in the 
host country, which can affect group solidarity 
and help migrants face their problems. As Atin 
Savitri (chairman of the ATKI Taiwan) has said, 
“…one problem faced by Indonesian migrant 
workers in Taiwan is that they do not have the 
right to participate at local trade unions, so in any 
problem they face, they don’t have the same rights 
as local workers. Indonesian migrant workers 
have no power to solve their problems through 
the courts or mediation from third parties. They 
are more likely to rely on a friend.” Thus, it is 
necessary to explore both solidarity and social 
networks as new challenges to migratory studies 
in Taiwan, whose complexities seem to deserve a 
more detailed empirical investigation. The ability 
to overcome obstacles in the migration process 
and in the receiving nation is not enough in itself; 
migrants also need socialization with friends to 
solve their fragmentation.
CONCLUSION
The experience of Indonesian migrants in 
Taiwan indicates that the migration industry has 
largely reduced everything to a matter of supply 
and demand, the profit motive being the ultimate 
aim. This approach dehumanizes migrant workers, 
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making them into nothing more than economic 
commodities to be bought and sold. This paper 
has explored the migration industry and migrant 
situation in Taiwan, revealing that migrants are 
trapped in debt. This condition arises from the 
debtor’s pledge of his or her personal services, 
or those of a person under his or her control, as 
security for a debt. All these challenges regarding 
human slavery are just the logical endpoint, 
the most extreme form separating the human 
economy from the commercial economy). As 
Graeber (2011) shows, there is and always has 
been a curious affinity between wage labor and 
slavery (p. 163), whether an individual has been 
sold or simply rented out, but the involvement of 
money belittles individual identity until the person 
is capable of doing his or her duty (Graber 2011: 
352). However, this study demonstrates the sali-
ence of the migration industry and its socio-eco-
nomic implications among Indonesian migrants 
in Taiwan. Although migrant workers make an 
important contribution to economic development 
in their home countries, the attention to improving 
their protection and empowerment both inside and 
outside the country is still inadequate.
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